GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF TRANSPORTATION
CHARGES.-PART IV.
IIIThe

Practicalityof State Interference with Transportation Contracts-Continued.

The case of Smyth v. Ames' aroused great excitement, and
widely different views have been evoked by it. Some authorities, as Prof. Frank Haigh Dixon, of Dartmouth College,'
consider that the decision enunciates no new principle, and
that no one need have been astonished by it. On the other
hand, the Nation' cites the case as authority for the statement that "the attempt to regulate the interstate. business of
railroads has broken down," because the law of this country,
"by the agency of the courts, guarantees to every man and
to every corporation the management of its own business.
When the Constitution says that no one shall be deprived of
life, liberty and property without 'due process of law,' it means,
without what the courts say is due process of law, ascertained
through judicial inquiry. Consequently, the time will never
come when a political or administrative body will be allowed
to fix rates and decide that they are 'just.' Until our system
of civilization disappears, what is just will be determined by
a court of justice according to principles laid down by judges,
and not by legislatures or their delegates."
The inhabitants of the states most nearly affected by the
recent decision are in a high state of indignation and wrathful
uncertainty. Governor Leedy, of Kansas, has issued an interview, with the reported approval of Chief Justice Doster, of his
own Supreme Court, in which he uses language .of the most
unrestrained denunciation, ending: "Nobody but a slave or a
knave will yield assent to the"liideo,:s dittortion of meaning
which Judge Harlan gives to the word;-hperson' as used in
'169 U. S. 466 (1898), modified

171 U. S. 361,
Control in Nebraska," in the Political
Science Quarterly for December, 1898.
3 Vol. 66, p. 220.
2See his article, "Railroad
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the Fourteenth Amendment, and upon which he bottoms his
infamous decision, and which shows to what depths of iniquity
the Supreme Court of the United States has descended." The.
Review of Reviews for April, 1898, contains a more temperate expression of the Western view: " I wonder if I am
mistaken in regarding the recent decision of the Supreme
Court, written by Judge Harlan, on the Nebraska .maximum
rate law, as a more dangerous one than either the Dred Scott
decision or that on the income tax ? The Dartmouth College
decision attempted to take corporations out from under the
police (regulative) power of the state by construing franchises
as contracts. This decision seems to me to rule that frauds,.
like watering stock, and extortions like excessive charges,
committed under those charters, are also contracts.
There is, then, absolutely no help for the people through the
exercise of their reserved powers of regulation and the inalienable right of 'police regulation.' The Supreme Court
rules that corporations are persons under the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The corporations have added to
them what must be almost the last privilege they could hope
for-that of having all the privileges of personality, but none
of the responsibilities. They are persons, in the eyes of our
corporation-controlled courts, who can have every possible
privilege, but are never to be punished like ordinary persons.
. . . This is a Dred Scott decision which says that white men
have no rights that any corporation is bound to respect."
Mr. H. P. Robinson, editor of the Railway Age, gives
almost as much scope to the decision as the men of the West,
and rejoices to conclude that railway rates are now absolutely
beyond control of the legislatures in all the "Granger" or
"Populistic" states.'
These varying views remit us, for satisfaction, to the case
itself. But, before reaching -the case, the previous conditions in Nebraskv demand attention.
These conditions
amounted to a state of war between the Nebraska legislature
and the railroads.
1

See Mr. Robinson's article in the North American Review for April,

1898.
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A legislature is usually a body whose technical knowledge
of railway management is of the slightest; its members, especially in a Western state like Nebraska, are apt to be innocent of bondholding or shareholding; and, looking at the
matter solely from the standpoint of the land-owning and producing classes, are inclined to treat the railroad much as the
early English Parliaments treated the laborers and merchants.
The legislature, though representing the state, must feel
weaker in wealth and material resources than the railroads it
attempts to control. Mr. A. G. Warner' pointed out, eight
years ago, that "in financial power . . .the railroad systems
indefinitely surpass any state that their branches happen to
cross." The annual revenue of Nebraska is between two and
three millions; the annual earnings of the railroads running
through the state are from. ten to thirty millions each. "It
will be seen how disproportionate is the financial strength of
the antagonists, if only one of the railroads is at issue with
the state on a given question; and, on a question where it is
the state against all the railroads, the odds are still more in
favor of the latter." Mr. Warner then proceeds to show how
this financial superiority of railroads enables them to command
the services of men of greater ability than the state can afford
to do. The salaries of the railway officials run upwards to
$20,000, or even higher, while the highest paid state official
in Nebraska receives only $250o a year. The present constitution, having been adopted just after the grasshopper plague,
provides in every case for the lowest possible salary, and limits
the legislature to a sixty days' session every two years.
The railroads all have their principal offices and over half
their mileage outside the limits of the state. " Practically
none of the stocks and bonds of the railroads in Nebraska are
owned by Nebraskans. The owners and controlling officers
of the roads are non-residents. This absenteeism increases
the popular dislike of the road. It is felt that any unearned
profits not only injure individuals but impoverish the communit, as a whole, while the representatives of the roads within
the state are looked upon as mere hirelings, owing to the
1

"Railroad Problems in the West," VI rol. Se.

66. March, i89I.
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companies duties, which are inconsistent with good citizenship."
The mileage of the Nebraska roads increased from 305 in
i866 to IIoo in 1875, and to 5500 in 1893. The growing
importance of the railways caused the constitution of 1875 to
empower the legislature to fix maximum charges, to prevent
discrimination, and to enforce its mandates by forfeiture if
necessary. The Act of February 2, 188i, was passed "to
prevent discrimination," and provided that the rates should
not be higher than the published rates of November I, I 88o,
which were the lowest up to that time. A Railroad Commission was created by the Act of March 5, 188 5 (Laws, ch. 65)..
This was changed by the Act of March 3!, x887 (Laws, ch.
60), to the "Board of Transportation," composed of five state
officers and three other members appointed by the former.
Upon these latter, of course, fell most of the work. The
powers given this board were almost identical with those exercised by the English "Board of Trade."' The principal
difference is that the orders of the English Board of Trade are
"confirmed" in each case by a special act of Parliament,
while those of the Nebraska Board were enforced by mandamus from the State Supreme Court. Thus, in the year of
the passage of this act, the Fremont, Elkhorn and Missouri
Valley Railroad refused to conform to an order of the Board
reducing its rates 33 Y per cent. This order the Supreme Court
enforced by mandamus in State ex rel. Board of Transportation v. Fremont,E. & H. V. R. Co.2 But the actions of the
Board of Transportation did not satisfy the farmers, who constituted the bulk of the Nebraska population. According to
Mr. Warner's article' the politicians publicly opposed the railroads, but secretly were "influenced" to subservience. "The
language and the actions of the politicians" were so inconsistent that the people became enraged beyond endurance.
The result of the ensuing campaign was the law of April 12,
1893, an act "to regulate railroads, to classify freights, to fix
ISee infra.
222

Neb. 313, S. C., 35 N. W. 11:8 (x887).

3 Sup ra.

Opinion by Maxwell, C.J.
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reasonable maximum rates to be charged for the taansportation of freights upon each of the railroads in the State of Nebraska, and to provide penalties for the violation of this act."'
Section 5 of the statute provided that if any railroad in the
state should believe the schedule of rates prescribed by the
act to be unjust and unreasonable, opportunity should be
given for such railroad to bring action in the Supreme Court
of the state against the State of Nebraska; "and upon a
hearing thereof, if the court shall become satisfied that the
rates herein prescribed are unjust in so far as they relate to
the railroad bringing the action, (it) may issue their (its)
order directing the Board of Transportation to permit such
railroad to raise its rates to any sum in the discretion of the
Board," provided the new tariff did not exceed that in force
January 1, 1893. This law was to go into effect August I,
1893. Proceedings to test the law were begun July 28,
1893, and complainants obtained from the United States Circuit Court a decree enjoining all enforcement of the act, which
was finally passed upon by the Supreme Court March 7,
1898, nearly five years after its passage. Brewer, J., said in
the Circuit Court at Omaha : ", If it would be unreasonable to
reduce the total earnings of these roads 29Y2 per cent., it is
,pima acie, at least, equally unreasonable to so reduce any
single fractional part of such earnings;" and the learned justice, following this argument, found the prinafaciesconfirmed
by the elaborate tables and schedules submitted to him, and
made the preliminary injunction permanent. Dundy, J., concurred. From this it is to be inferred that an unreasonable
rate, prima face, is one which reduces compensation. The
converse would follow, that a reasonable rate is one increasing, or not decreasing, the income of the carrier. The opinion
of Mr. Justice Harlan in the Supreme Court is much to the
same effect. This question,
.r. Wiat is a Reasonable Rate?
was pronounced by Judge Cooley, in his address to the Con' Acts of Nebraska, 1893, Ch. 24, p. x64 ; compiled Statutes of Nebraska
(8th Ed.), 1897, c. 72, art. 12, p. 81g.
2 64 Fed. 165 (1894>.
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vention of Railroad Commissioners, March 3, 1891, at Washington, to be the railroad problem. It seems to be one almost
baffling solution. Said Railroad Commissioner Becker, Qf
Minnesota, addressing the Fifth Annual Convention of Railroad Commissioners in 1893, " I have never seen yet an
answer to the question, What is a reasonable rate ? "'
I. The Railway View.
The argument is sometimes made that "the market value
of the service," or "what the traffic will bear," is the only
reasonable rate. It is asserted that the utmost possible charge
for transportation is limited to the difference between the cost
of the commodity at the place of producion, and its price at
the terminus of the road. Elaborate arguments are made to
show how competition between the shipper and carrier for the
margin of profit which lies in this difference, will gradually
result in a compromise, satisfactory to neither party, perhaps,
but still infinitely preferable to any rate arbitrarily fixed by an
outside body.2 The argument is plausible, and the reasoning
of a kind that falls in with traditional American ideas of personal independence. But the statement that the carrier's
charge is limited to the difference between the cost of the
article at one point and its selling price at the other, ignores
the fact that this very selling price is determined by the
average cost of production of the commodity plus the average
of the transportation charges to the market, and is thus a
pctitio princypii. The view of the question from this latter
standpoint convinces many that if the railway is uncontrolled
by law, "it can levy what tribute it pleases, direct the channels
I Mr. H. R. Shorter, State Railroad Commissioner of Alabama, said at
Washington, in May, 1895 (see report Seventh Annual Convention Railroad Commissioners, p. 35), "For the past ten years, in an official way,
I have wrestled with these two questions-the value of a railroad and a
reasonable rate. I never found, during my experience as a Railroad
Commissioner, what was a reasonable rate until I got that information
from the distinguished former chairman of the Interstate Commerce
Commission in this room several years ago, when he said to me that he
believed, as the result of his observation, that a reasonable rate was one
under which a trader thought he had some little advantage of his ad'versary. 1"

S"Railroad Stockwatering," by Thomas L. Greene, VI Pol. Sc. Q. 474.
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of trade and the tides of business, make and unmake cities,
build up and put down industries, enrich and impoverish individuals and communities. . . . IThe state must control
the railways or the railways will control the state.'
The "Public" View.
So conservative a jurist as the late Justice Cooley declared
that "So long as five hundred bodies of men in the country
are at liberty to make rate sheets at pleasure, and to unmake
or cut and re-cut them in every direction at their own unlimited discretion, or want of discretion, and with little restraint
on the part of the law, except as it imposes a few days delay
in putting changes in force, the problem will remain to trouble
us; the mere existence of the power, making losses, disorder
and confusion constantly imminent. The authority to reduce
rates when they are found to be excessive is but a slight cor" 2
rective. .
Railroad Commissioner Becker, of Minnesota, said further,
". .
the expense which a railroad company is at to carry
the freight, or to manage its busiiess affairs, is a matter which
does not enter at all into the question of what is a reasonable
rate. . . . When we consider the question of a reasonable rate, we look at it from the railroad standpoint, not from
the standpoint of the shippei, and we are apt to forget the
interest of the shipper. . . . I don't believe the railroads
will be justified in demanding a rate which will crush out the
industries of the country. . . . I object most strenuously,
as a citizen, against any form of authority which undertakes
to say that the people of this country are bound forever to
pay the interest upon the bonds of any railroad company by
freight tariffs, or the dividend upon any stock by freight
tariffs.
. ,,
2.

The "public" view thus defines a reasonable rate as that
Report Com. on Reasonable Rates, Fourth Annual Convention Railroad Commissioners.
2 Address of Hon. Thomas M. Cooley, Chairman, to the Convention of
Railroad Commissioners, report of Third Annual Convention, page 31.
3 Address to the Fifth Annual Convention of Railroad Commissioners,
at Washington, 1893.
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which is reasonablefor the people to pay, not what is reasonable
for the carrier to receive.'
What may be characterized as
3. The "Judicial" View
occupies a position somewhere between these two extremes
and will most clearly appear in the discussion of
.2. The Mfeansfor Determining a "Reasonable Rate."

Mr. Justice Harlan declares' that in order to determine
whether any given rates are, or are not, such as to allow the
carrier reasonable compensation, the basis of calculation must
be "the fair value of the property" used by the corporation.
"And in order to ascertain that value, the original cost of
construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the amount and market value of its bonds axd stock
(italics mine), the present as compared with the original cost
of construction, the probable earning capacity of the property
under particular rates prescribed by statute, and the sum
required to meet operating expenses, are all mattes for consideration, and afe to be given such weight as may be just
and right in each case."
Also, ". . . the reasonableness or unreasonableness of
rates prescribed by a state for the transportation of persons
and property wholly within its limits must be determined
without reference to the business of an interstate character
done by the carrier, or to the profits derived from that busi-

I This definition receives support in Canada Southern Railway Co. v.
International Bridge Co., 8 App. Cas. (P. C.) 723 (x883), in which the
question arose of what was a reasonable rate of toll over a public bridge.
Complaint had been made that the tolls were unreasouably high, because
resulting in a enormously large profit to the bridge company, but the

court held that the profits made by the company were to be absolutely
disregarded, the sole criterion being-the reasonableness from the standpoint of the public. The tolls being reasonable, viewed in that light,
they could stand, though the company obtained fabulous returns. "It
certainly appears to their Lordships that the principle must be, when
reasonableness comes in question, not what profit it may be reasonable
for a company to make, but what it is reasonable to charge to the person
who is charged."

(P. 37r.)

2 Smyth v. Ames, x69 U. S. 466, at p. 546-7.
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ness."
Or, as this part of the decision is explained by Mr.
Robinson, "the rates imposed in Nebraska by the state legislature must be such as will give a fair return on the railway
properties inside the State of Nebraska, measured by the
volume of business in Nebraska. A railway company, say
the Burlington road, cannot be compelled to do Nebraska
business at unprofitable figures, on the ground that its lines
in, perhaps, Illinois, are so profitable that the company, as a
whole, will still make money." 2

1Smyth

v. Ames, sufira, at p. 541.
2 See article in N. A. Rev., April, 1898. It appears from this article
that on the average a railroad costs for operating at least seventy per
cent of its gross earnings. Mr. Robinson has calculated the earnings
per mile for the railroads in each of twenty-eight states, together with
the amount of capital upon which the net income of these roads will pay
interest at the rate of six per cent. The table follows :
State
Gross Earnings 3o per cent. of
Being 6 per
per mile.
gross earnings,
cent. upon:
North Carolina ............
$2,864
$859
$14,320
South Carolina ...........
3,125
937
15,620
North Dakota ............
3,419
1,o25
17,090
Georgia .....................
3,484
1,045
17,420
Nebraska ...................
.3,487
x,o46
17,433
Texas .......................
3,742
1,122
18,710
Alabama ....................
7,781
1,134
18,9oo
Michigan ...................
3,835
1,150
19,170
Kansas ......................
4,482
1,344
22,6io
Missouri .....................
4,768
1,430
23.86o
Iowa .........................

4,792

1,437

23,960

1.902

31,7

1,977

32,96o

Wisconsin ..................
Maine ........................
Kentucky ..................
Virginia ....................
Minnesota ..................

5,346
5,446
£%oo3
.3 9 3
C -,2

1,63
1.633
i,8oo

Illinois .......................
California .................
Ohio ..........................
Massachusetts .............

C.Sot
.199
S:36,

2,041
2,459
2,508
3,'035

34,030
40,990
41,6io
50,590

26,730
27,230
30,010
To

New Hampshire ..........
New York ..................

io.I8
11,361
13,787

3,408
4,136

c6,8oo
68,930

Pennsylvania ..............

15,103

4.530

75,510

Connecticut ...............
Rhode Island ..............
New Jersey ................
Vermont ....................

15,698
16,223
18,777
18,932

4,709
4,866
5,633
5,679

78,490
8rio
93,880
94,660

From this table, Mr. Robinson draws the conclusion that "the recent
decision places an absolute veto in the way of any legislation in any
one of twenty-six states (the t%%enty-six consist of the eleven in the
above table, which have not business enough to produce a profit on railway operation, together with fifteen other state for which the figures
are not available, but which, a-, 31r. Robins-on says, 'undoubtedly fall
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3. Whose Determination Shall be Final?
This question is decisively met and answered. 'While rates
for the transportation of persons and property within the limits
of a state are primarily for its determination, the question
whether they are so unreasonably low as to deprive the carrier of its property without such compensation as the Constitution secures, and therefore without due proces's of law,
cannot be so conclusively determined by the legislature of the
state, or by regulations adopted under its authority, that the
matter may not become the subject of judicial inquiry.. .. .
"The idea that any legislature, state or Federal, can conclusively determine for the people and for the courts that what it
enacts in the form of law, or what it authorizes its agents to
do, is inconsistent with the fundamental law, is in opposition
to the theory of our institutions. The duty rests upon all
courts, Federal and state, when their jurisdiction is properly invoked, to see to it that no right secured by the supreme law of
the land is impaired or destroyed by legislation. This function
and ditty of the judiciary distinguishes the American system
from all other systems of government. The perpetuity of our
institutions and the liberty which is enjoyed under them depend,
in no small degree, upon the power given thejudiciary to declare
in the same category,') which will reduce rates or cut down earnings.
In each and every one of them, no law which by any amount, however
small, adds to the burdens of the railwaycompanies, can be constitutional." To these states are to be added, twelve states in which the railroads can make only a "fair profit," under present conditions, and
accordingly, "the railway companies will have no difficulty whatever in
showing any such (restrictive) legislation to be plainly confiscatory and

unconstitutional." There are left in the entire Union only eight states
whose roads have an average earning capacity of $xo,ooo and upward,
and in which alone restrictive legislation under the Nebraska Decision
would be constitutional; and these are states with little disposition to
trouble the railway rates.
We thus have the authority of one of the railway experts of America
for the startling proposition that the Nebraska Freight Tax Decision
absolutely forbids, as long as the conditions under which it was delivered
continue, any government restriction of transportation

charges in

thirty-eight states of the Union. If such government regulation is a
desirable thing, the conclusion thus reached might perhaps lead us to
doubt, with deference, the wisdom of the action of the Supreme Court
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null and void all legislation that is clearly repugnant to the supreme law of the land.'
4. What Amounts to a " Taking" of Property " Without Due
Process of Law?"
The answer to this has already been foreshadowed. "A
state enactment, or regulations made under the authority of a
state enactment, establishing rates for the transportation of
persons or property by railroad that will not admit of the carrier earning such compensation as under all the circumstances
is just to it and to the public (italics mine), would deprive such
carrier of its property without due process of law and deny to
it the equal protection of the laws, and would, therefore, be
repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
'
of the United States.

2

Does the case decide anything new? It seems to the writer
that it certainly does. Its adjudications on several points are
either entirely novel or else presented with a strength and
positiveness hitherto unknown.
(I) The definition of a reasonable rate was before unsettled,
and still is so. But now we know that the primary ingredient is reasonablenessfrom the standpoint of the return to the
carrier, other considerations, such as the interests of the
public, being placed subordinate to the former.
(2) So clear an enumeration of the means for determining a
reasonable rate had never before been attempted. It is very
novel, in two points particularly, (a) in calculating the rate by
the "market value of the stocks and bonds," and (b) in the
entire exclusion of interstate business from the eleme ts entering into the determination of the intra-state rate.
(3)The question, whose determination shall be final, has at
last received an authoritative answer. As matters now stand,
the final determination of the reasonableness of any rate assessed by public authority upon a business in which the public
is specially interested rests with the Federal Courts, provided
only some stockholder in the corporation is a citizen of a

I Smyth v. Ames,
2 16. p. 526.

sufira, at p. 526.
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state other than that of the charter, a nearly invariable circumstance.
(4)No positive and authoritative statement had been pre-viously enunciated that a rate, if "unreasonable," on that
account necessarily "takes" property "without due process
of law."'
Another entirely novel conclusion is embodied in the following language of the opinion in the Nebraska Freight Case (see pp. 54, 550):
. . . "But it may be added that the conditions of business, so far aa
railroad corporations are concerned, have probably changed for the better
since the decree below, and that the rates prescribed by the statute of 1893
may now afford all the compensation to which the railroad companies in
Nebraska are entitled as between them and the pablic. In anticipation,
perhaps, of such a change of circumstances, and the exceptional character of the litigation, the Circuit Court wisely provided in its final
decree that the defendants, members of the Board of Transportation,
might, 'when the circumstances have changed so that the rates fixed in
the said act of 1893 shall yield to the said companies reasonable compensation for the services aforesaid,' apply to the court, by bill or otherwise
as they might be advised, for a further order in that behalf .Of this
provision of the final decree the State Board of Transportation, if so advised, can avail itself. In that event, if the Circuit Court finds that the
present condition of business is such as to admit of the application of the
statute to the railroad companies in question without depriving them of
just compensation, it will be its duty to discharge the injunction heretofore granted, and to make whatever order is necessary to remove any obstruction placed by the decrees in these cases in the way of the enforcement of the statute." Accordingly the decree of the court was modified
in 171 U. S. 36!.

It appears from this that an act may be unconstitutional this year, but
constitutional next year, if increase of business or reduction of expenses
brings greater prosperity to the railroads. Conceivably an act might be
unconstitutional January ist, and constitutional February ist; void today, but good to-morrow. In like manner an act constitutional on the
day it becomes law may come to be unconstitutional by operation of
nothing more than lapse of time, weeks or months or years. Under this
decision we might have laws valid up to the 1st of January, x898, invalid
for six months or a year thereafter, perhaps after this interregnum to
take on a new lease of validity. If a law is constitutional when passed,
and the railroad officials know that it will become void if the net earnings
are reduced by its operation, will there not be the strongest incentive to
make such reduction appear? and when the railroad attorney appears
before the Circuit Court for a temporary injunction, the court, to give a
decision with an approximation to fairness, must go into the question of
whether or not the railway expenses are legitimate- whether the officers
are not too numerous or too highly paid. On this hypothesis the prospect before our already overworked Federal Courts is anything but
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It has been urged, in opposition to the court's conclusion,
that a "basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness of
rates," which consists in part of "the market value of the
bonds and stock" (see opinion quoted above), involves reasoning in a circle, a begging of the question, because such
market value depends upon an earning capacity determined
by the rates charged-the very thing it is proposed to restrict. By the method of calculating used in the opinion,
evidently a statute might be constitutional for one road and
unconstitutional for another. Or, if the court should favor
uniformity of rates for parallel roads, the wonder arises what
rates the legislature can prescribe, since any imaginable tariff
must necessarily fail to give a net profit to some road; and
one road on the verge of bankruptcy might secure the privilege of high rates for all the wealthier railways running parallel with it.
Again it has been declared that, in entirely excluding interstate transportation from consideration in computing the rate

within the state, the court has adopted a more conservative
method of estimate than the railroads themselves.

Freight

charges to grain elevator centres, and to cities engaged in the
pork and beef-packing industries, are often voluntarily placed
by the roads at a rate which would result in a dead loss, if it
were not for the interstate business thus stimulated.1
It will be seen that there appears in this case a novelty,

both of expression and of substance, almost unheralded in
previous decisions. Various expressions, which might be
applied to the circumstances of the Nebraska case, had been
used in other cases, but few of these were more than dicta.
In Munn v. Illinois2 it was said that "down to the Fourteenth
cheerful. Moreover, the cases would invariably be appealed from the
Circuit Courts to the Supreme Court, and the decision reached by that
body, after lengthy and laborious examination of all the details of business management and the lapse of several years, would be valueless as
applying to the circumstances which existed at the time the case arose.
II am indebted to Mr. Emory R. Johnson, of the Wharton School of
the University of Pennsylvania, for the attitude of political economists
on this and kindred points.
2 P. 125.
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Amendment it was not supposed that statutes regulating the
use, or even the price of the use, of private property necessarily deprived an owner of his property without due process of
law. Under some circumstances they may, but not under all."
But against this may be placed the Chief Justice's further language: 1 , .
it has been customary, from time immemorial, for the legislature to declare what shall be a -reasonable
compensation . . . we know that this is a power which may
be abused, but that is no argument against its existence. For
.irotection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to
the polls, not to the courts." In the Railroad Commission cases2
Waite, C. J., said: " From what has thus* been said, it is notto be inferred that this power of limitation or regulation is
itself without limit. This power to regulate is not a power to
destroy, and limitation is not the equivalent of confiscation.
Under pretence of regulating fares and freights, the state
cannot require a railroad corporation to carry persons or
property without reward; neither can it do that which in law
amounts to a taking of private property for public use without
just compensation, or without due process of law." It should
be noted here that Chief Justice Waite's language, as quoted,
might have been followed out literally by the courts without
leading them to the extremes to which they have gone. The
statement that "the state cannot require a railroad corporation
to carry . . . without reward," may, perhaps, furnish an indication of what the learned justice meant by the rest of his
sentence. The Chief Justice went on to show that no such
question was then at issue, and the case was decided in favor
of the constitutionality of the statute.
Mr. Justice Harlan quotes from St. Louis, Etc., R. v. Gill,3
in which it was said that there is a remedy in the courts
against legislation so unreasonable as practically to destroy
the value of property, and that the question is a judicial one.
But in this case the constitutionality of the statute of Arkansas
was upheld. The case of Covington, Etc., Turnpike Co. v.
p. 133.
2 ni6 U. S. 307, 331.
3

156 U. S. 6,t9, 657 (1894).

GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF TRANSPORTATION CHARGES.

369

Sanford' supports in its language the Nebraska Freight case,
but no actual deterrmination as to reasonableness of rates was
made. The cause was remanded for further proceedings.
. The state courts, of course, have taken a more lenient
view
of the legislative power. Dilfon v. R. 2 says . . . "the reasonable regulation of a business . . . affected with a public interest is n6t a tairng.of property without due process of law.
We cannot, therefore, judicially determine . . . that the provisions of the act are unreasonable . . . The unreasonableness
of the provisions is to be determined as a question of fact,"

citing R. v. Wellman,' where Mr. Justice Brewer asks "must
it be declared, as matter of law, that a reduction of rates
necessarily diminishes income? May it not be possible-indeed, does not all experience suggest the probability-that a
reduction of rates will increase the amount of business, and,
therefore, the earnings? At any rate, must the court assume
that it has no such eflect; and, ignoring all other considerations, hold, as matter of law, that a reduction of rates necessarily diminishes the earnings ? If the validity of such a law,
in its application to a particular company, depends upon a
question of fact as to its effect upon the earnings, may not the
court properly leave that question to the jury and decline to
assume that the effect is as claimed? There can be but one
answer to these questions." 4 Winchester, Etc., Turnpike Co.
z64 U. S. 578, 584, 594-5, 597 (x896).
of N. V., 43 N.Y. Suppl. 320, 328 (1897).
3 I43 U. S. 339 at 343 (1892).
4The idea that the reasonableness of a rate is a question of fact and not
of law is favored in Palmer v. London & S. W. R., L. R. I C. P. 593
(1866); Diphwys Casson Slate Cc,. v. Festiniog Ry.Co., 2 Ry. & Can.
Traf. Cas. 73 (1874) ; Denaby Co. v. Manchester, Etc., R., 3 Ry.& Can.
Traf Cas. 426 (188o) ; S. C., ii App. Cas. 97, and Phipps v. London & N.
W. R., 2 Q. B. D. 229, 236 (1892). These cases deal with the question of
"undue preference" as making the rate unreasonable. On the otherhand,
in Tobin v. London & N. W. Ry. Co., [1895] 2 Ir. R. 22 (Q. B. D.), it is
said: f Juries would, of course, take different views, according to the
train service of their locality; and, if the management of good traffic
depended on their decision, it would become a chaos, resulting in the
ruin of the company under an avalanche of litigation.". This language
refers particularly to the reasonableness of time schedules, but might
apply as well to rates.
1

2S. C.
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v. Croxtonl has this language: "Admittedly the rate fixed is
reasonable-te legislative will so declares-but what is reserved? What is it that the public is interested in reserving?
Manifestly that the rate should ondmnue reasonable, and what
was to be deemed reasonable in the future the legislature was
to decide, whenever it chose to act."
But the legislative discretion as to reasonableness has now
become so straitly circumscribed by the Federal courts, that
we may expect their read to be followed by the courts of the
states; and, unless a decided change comes in judicial opinion
generally, few such instances as that just cited from Kentucky
can be noted anywhere. Mr. Justice Brewer's suggestion that
the question is one of fact for the jury seems to -have met
little favor, although the reasons he adduces are weighty. It
is true, however, that a jury's verdict on such matters might
be very uncertain and inclined against the railway irrespective
of the facts, and the facts are usually presented in the form of
tables and intricate calculations very puzzling to the layman.
Indeed, even the judge seems not particularly fitted for technical problems of railway construction and management.
Prima fade the proper authority for the adjudication of such
questions would be a body composed of persons especially
trained in railway affairs. If rates must be fixed by any one
other than the officials of the railway company, a commission
of experts certainly would seem, theoretically at least, the
ideal body for assessment of the charges. Mr. Justice Harlan
himself says: " What are the considerations to which weight
must be given when we seek to ascertain the compensation that
a railroad company is entitled to receive? . . . Undoubtedly

that questfon could be more easily determined b a commission composed of persons whose special skill, observation and
experience qualifies (qualify) them to so handle great problems
of transportation as to do justice both to the public and to
those whose money has been used to construct and maintain
highways for the convenience and benefit of the people. But
despite the difficulties that confessedly attend the proper solu2
tion of such questions, the court cannot shrink, etc."
198 Ky. 739 (1896).
2 Opinion Nebraska Freight Case, suPra, at p. 527.
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It will be remembered that the early Vermont Act of 1849
provided that its Supreme Court, on petition of ten freeholders,
should alter or reduce rates as they should deem expedient.
This provision (which is believed to be unique among statutes
of this kind) is still substantially in force: "The Supreme
Court, at any term thereof, on application in writing of three
or more freeholders of the state .. . may from time to time
* ..

alter. or reduce the toll of any railroad operated in this

state." ' This expressly makes the court a commission for
fixing rates. But commissions have usually consisted of persons specially appointed for that purpose.
The New Hampshire law provides for a Board of Railroad
Commissioners consisting of three persons. "No person who
owns railroad stock, or who is employed by a railroad corporation, or who is otherwise, interested in one, shall be eligible
to the office. No more than two members shall be appointed
from one political party." The members of the commission
are appointed by the Governor. "The expenses of the Board,
including the salaries of its members, shall be borne by the
railroad corporations in proportion to their gross receipts."
. . . "The Commissioners shall fix the maximum charges to
be made by the proprietors of railroads with the state for the
transportation of persons and freight, and shall change the
same from time to time as the public good shall require, subject to existing limitations. The rates so fixed shall be binding
upon the proprietors." 2 Thirty-two states 3 have commissions
similar to that of New Hampshire. Not' all, however, have
the privilege of changing rates.
ISee Vermont Statutes of x894, p. 696, secs. 3896 and 3897.
2
Public Statutes of New Hampshire, pp. 428, 429, 430 (1891).
3

These states include Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut,
Colorado, Georgia, Illinois (warehouses also), Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Massachusetts, Milinesota (warehouses)i Mississippi, Missouri
(waretouses);,Nebraska (railroads, telegraphs, telephones, express-companies, warehouses), New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North
Daiota, Ohio (railroads and telegraphs), Oregou, Pennsylvania, (Department of Internal Affairs), South' Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont (it is expressly provided that the Acts of the Vermont Commissioners shall' not "impair the rights of duties of the railioadi." As
already stated; the rate-making power is in the Supreme Court)i Virginia,
Wisconsin.
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The fact that so many states have established bodies like
those described, and the high opinion entertained of them by
the United States Supreme Court, would seem to point .to
greater success in rate-making by commissions than in that
by direct legislative action, such as was considered in the
Nebraska case.. On the other hand, it might possibly be anticipated that the courts would be jealous of the .powers and
jurisdiction of the newly-established commissions, as the old
judges of the common law were of the admiralty and equity
courts. The latter anticipation has proved correct. The'
experience of one state will illustrate the general attitude the
courts have adopted toward the railroad commissions.
In 1887 the State of Florida established a railroad commission I with powers similar to those of the Board. of Trade
under the English Railway and Canal Traffic Act. In an
action brought. by the state 2 to recover penalties alleged to
have been incurred under the Railroad Commission Acts, the
railroad pleaded "that it could not pay the expenses -of operating its road by charging for transportation of persons and
things the rates fixed for it by the railroad commissioners, or
by charging less rates than those charged by it to the passenger named." To this plea the state demurred. The
Supreme Court declared that "the legal proposition asserted
by the Circuit Court in sustaining the demurrer to this plea is
that the state may, through the instrumentality of the commissioners, prescribe and may enforce through the courts,
passenger and freight tariffs which do not pay the railroad
company the expenses of operating its road; that the judgment or discretion of the commissioners is conclusive as to
the reasonableness of the rates as against the interference of
the courts or any other power, except it may be the legislature.
The commissioners say the company must not
charge more than three cents, although it will compel a loss
of money, and the company says it cannot pay operating
expenses at the rates of freight and passenger charges preSee Revised Stats. of Florida, 1892, p. 746,
2287 and 2288.
Pensacola, etc., R. v. State, 25 Fla. 310, 3 L. R. A. 661, Raney, C. J.,
1889.
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scribed by the commissioner's, or without charging "4jfcents
per mile. Our opinion is that the action of the commissioners
in prohibiting the larger rate is a, palpable abuse of their discretion and a trespass upon the rights of the company, and
one which, if enforced with the freight rates prescribed, would
amount in law and in fact to taking the property of the
company without just compensation. It is not a reasonable
rate, considered either with reference to the interests of the
people or those of the railroad company, or both."
The attitude of the court seems unfavorable. The statute
creating the commission is strictly construed against that
commission's powers, and the court shows no disposition to
allow the business before the commissioners to get beyond
judicial reach. The result of the condition of things in
Florida was the repeal of all the Railroad Commission Acts'
Railroad Commission v. R. likewise held that "whether the
rules and regulations of the railroad commission are reasonable or not, is a question of law for the court." The finding
of the court in this case, however, was favorable to the commission.
The United States Supreme Court had declared in the Railroad Commission Cases 3 that a Board of Commissioners is a
proper tribunal for determining the proper rates of fare and
freight on the railroads of a state. But in the Minnesota
cases,4 the Minnesota Railroad Commission Act was declared
unconstitutional because the act provided that the rates recommended by the commission should be "final and conclusive as to what are equal and reasonable charges." The
courts were not allowed to interfere. "In other words,
although the railroad company is forbidden to establish rates
that are not equal and reasonablej there is no power in the
courts to sfay the hands of the commission, #f it chooses to
establish rates that are unequal and unreasonable."' Thus it
1Revised Statutes of Florida, 1892. Appendix. Chap. 4o68.
6
2 40 S. W. s2 (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, April 28, 1897).
3 xi6 U. S. 307 (z886).
' 134 U. S. 4,8 (i89o).
5

Following this decision, Southern Pacific Company v. Board of R. R.
Com., 78 Fed. 236 (C. C. N. D. Cal., 1896), held that the functions of a
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appears that both Federal and State Courts refuse to recog-

nize the standing of State Railroad Commissions. Naturally
the commissioners have chafed under this restraint of the.
courts. The State Railroad Commissioners, at their annulal
conventions at Washington, have expressed very frankly their
opinions in the matter.'
The condition of the Interstate Commerce Commissioners
has been no better than that of the state officials. Wheq
questions that had been investigated by the commissioners
were brought to the attention of the courts, they refused to
attach weight to the laborious findings the commissioners had
made. Chairman William R. Morrison,. of the Interstate
Commission, said, in 1892,2 "When an investigation has been

made, involving vast expense, witnesses summoned from different parts of the country, or, if you please, when the commissioners have gone to the localities, and made investigation,
and reached a conclusion, it (they) must go to the courts to
enforce the orders made on the conclusion arrived at, and as
the law now stands, the court, before it undertakes to enforce
orders, undertakes to ascertain whether they are lawful orders
in a new trial and investigation. After we have investigated
questions, made orders, and reached conclusions, necessarily
at great expense, and then go into court-and ask the enforcement of our orders, the roads respond and make an entirely
new case and call new witnesses.

."

Commissioner

railroad commission "are not so purely legislative that it is not amenable
to the control of the courts, when it attempts to enforce a tariff of rates
which is unjust and unreasonable, . . . and that, while a state h*9
power to regulate railroad rates, such power, as well as the right of a
railroad company to control its business, stops at injustice, the state
having no right to fix a rate unreasonably low, though-it may prevent a
railroad from fixing one unreasonably high." A provision of the California Constitution making the rates fixed by the commission conclusively just and reasonable was pronounced void as in conflict with the
Vourteenth Amendment. This case .occupies about forty pages, a large
part of which consists of columns of figures and arithmetical computations of receipts and expenditures, rendered necessary by the investigation into the railroad business such cases always entail.
' See Reports of the Conventions.
2 Report Fourth Annual Convention P. R. Com., April, x892, pp.
123, X36.
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Veazey said at the same time, "Under the construction which
two or three Federal courts of the country have given this
act, they have made it in this respect (as to speedy and
economical remedy) a delusion and a snare. It does not
operate as a speedy, expeditious and economical remedy to
the complainant in any instance when the railroad company
sees fit not to obey the order of the commission.
The trouble was that in this new trial before the courts the
witnesses had to be called in from all over the country, and
the complainant had to bring in his witnesses all over again,
.

.

.

Under this construction of the act adopted by the

courts the railroad company does not feel obliged to bring any
more evidence before us than it feels disposed to offer
and relies on the prospect of a new trial when it can bring in
what witnesses it chooses.. .

.

.

If the Interstate Com-

merce Commission is composed of men such as they ought
to be, it may be assumed that they are as capable of getting
at the truth of the matter involving transportation charges, or
like subjects, as any one inexperienced man, however able he
may be. That is all there is of this question .
Mr. Allen Fort, Chairman of the Seventh Annual Convention of Railroad Commissioners, in his address to the Convention, May, 1895,' declared, "I concede, of course, with the
greatest respect, that it must be the observation of all that
nearly all of our appeals to the courts have not met with that
kind of assistance which we had reason to hope or expect.
The conservatism of the courts, if you please, has been an
obstruction to efficient and prompt railway regulation. Let
us hope that it will not always be so, but that there will be
that harmony between these tribunals and the courts and the
railroads that will remove the difficulty, that will secure even
and exact justice to the public, and at the same time, and
under any and all circumstances even and exact justice to the
railroads."
Mr. H. C. Adams, Statistician of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, says: "Had it been possible for the courts to
accept the spirit of the act (creating the commission), and to
I Report p.

9.
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render their assistance heartily and without reserve, there is
reason to believe that the pernicious discrimination in railway service and the unjust charges for transportation would
now be in large measure things of the past. As it is, the
most significant chapter in the history of the commission
pertains to its persistent endeavwos to work out some tvodus
vivendi without disturbing the dignity of the judiciary...
Had the courts been willing to grant the law the interpretation that Congress assumed for it when it was passed, the railway problem would by this time have approached more nearly
its final solution.' Mr. Adams, in the same article, sums up
the matter as follows: " What conclusion is warranted by
this rapid review of ten years' experience with the Federal acts
to regulate commerce? .
The record of the Interstate
Commerce Commission during the past ten years, as it bears
upon the theory of public control over monopolistic industries,
through the agencies of commissions, cannot be accepted as
in any sense final. It may ultimately prove to be the case, as
Ulrich declares, that there is no compromise between public
ownership and management on the one hand, and private ownership and management on the other; but no one has no right
to quote the ten years' experience of the Interstate Commerce
Commission in support of such a declaration. This is true,
because the law itself scarcely proceeded beyond the limit of
suggesting certain principles and indicating certain processes,
and Congress has not, by the amendments passed since 1887,
shown much solicitude respecting the efficiency of the act It
is true, also, because the courts have thought it necessary to
deny certain authorities claimed by the commission, and
again Congress has not shown itself jealous for the dignity of
the administrative body which it created; and, finally, it is
true, because the duty of administering the act was imposed
upon the commission without adequate provision in the way
of administrative machinery, and ten years is too short a time
to create that machinery, when every step is to be contested
by all the processes known to corporation lawryers. For the
1 ,,A

Decade of Federal Railway Regulation,"

At. Monthly, April, i893.

By Henry C. Adams,
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public the case stands where it stood ten years ago. Now, as
then, it is necessary to decide on the basis of theory, and in
the light of social, political and industrial consideration, rather
than on the basis of a satisfactory test, whether the railways
shall be controlled by the government, without being owned
or controlled through governmental ownership. The danger
is that the country will drift into an answer of this question
without an appreciation of its tremendous significance."
In the case of Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. R.,1 known as the "Chicago-Cincinnati
Freight Bureau Case," Mr. Justice Brewer said: "The question debated is whether it (Congress) vested in the commission
the power and the duty to fix rates; and the fact that this is
a debatable question, and has been strenuously and earnestly

debated, is very persuasive that it did not.
a power is never to be implied.

The grant of such

The power itself is so vast

and comprehensive, so largely affecting the rights of carrier
and shipper, as well as indirectly all commercial transactions,
This opinion followed Cincinnati, Etc., R. v.
Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 184 (1896), and was affirmed
by Interst. Com. Commission v. Ala. M. Ry., x68 U. S. 144, 173 (1897).
See, also, Interst. Com. Commission v. Western & A. R. 88 Fed. xS&
(x898). In the "Orange Rate Case," R. R. Com. of Fla. v. R., 5 Int.
C. C., 13 (1891), the commission undertook to regulate rates by themselves prescribing charges which they considered reasonable. This attempt aroused great excitement and anger on the part of many people,
and when the United States Suprenie Court, at the same time it delivered
its opinion in the Cincinnati-Chicago Freight Bureau Case, overruled the
action of the commission (see Savannah, F. & W. R. v. Florida Fruit
Rxch., 167 U. S. 512 [1897]), there was considerable relief. This was put
into expression by Jos. Nimmo, Jr., in an article in the Forum in September, 1897. Mr. Nimmo said: "And now the highest court of the
Federal Judiciary has repelled a similar attempt of the commission to
usurp the power of determining the limits of te commercial opportunity
of cities, states and sections, and of dictating the course of the commercial an' industrial development of this vast country through the power of
rate mhaking." The complaint of the possible unjust operation on various
localities of rats made by the c6tmission, appears staunge when ofie
consid rs the present discriminations and dictations employed to build
up cerlain sections and localities at the expense of others by private ifidividuils'for theiF own personal' gain. The 696ssile ause of power by men
appoiiifted to xiia1~e rates in the piublic ihfeilesf will scadcely be lilkely to
resuW in effect&S ifore disastr6us.
'167 U. S. 479 (I897).
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the language by which the power is given had been so often
used and is capable of such definite and exact statement, that
no just rule of construction would tolerate a grant of such
power by mere implication." Mr. Justice Harlan dissented.
After viewing the breakdown of the commission plan in the
United States, it will be interesting, and perhaps instructive,
to observe its operation in England. The Railway and Canal
Traffic Act of x888 provided for a Board of Trade, which
should have general supervision of railways and should determine, after conference with the railroad officials, upon schedules of rates. " In any case in which a railroad company
fails within the time mentioned in this section to submit a
classification and schedule to the Board of Trade, and also in
every case in which a railway company has submitted to the
Board of Trade a classification and schedule, and after hearing all parties whom the Board of Trade consider to be entitled to be heard before them, the Board of Trade are unable
to come to an agreement with the railway as to the.railway
company's classification and schedule. the Boardof Trade shall
determnine the classification of traffic which, in the opinion of
tMe Board of Trade, ought to be adopted by the raiway company, and the schedule of maximum rates and charges, including all terminal charges proposed to be authorized applicable to such classification which would, in the opinion of
t/te Board of Trade, bejust and reasonable, and shall make a
report to be submitted to Parliament, etc." 1 (Italics are mine.)
In 28 L. R. Stats. P. XV, 54 & 55 Vict., A. D. i891, I discover a number -f "Public Acts of a Local Character" in
the following form: "C C XIV. An Act to confirm a Provisional Order made by the Board of Trade under the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888, containing the classification
of Merchandise Traffic, and the 'Schedule of Maximum Rates
and Charges applicable thereto of the Great Eastern Railway
Company.'

.

.

."

This act seems to be somewhat more

practicable than its predecessor of King William's time.
No question can arise under the British Constitution as to
'See 25 L. R. S&-t-. p. 157; Acts 51 & 52 Vict., chap. 25, J 24. Amended
31 L. R. Stats. p. 18o, 57 & 58 Vict., ch. 54.
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the power of the Board of Trade to determine conclusively
the rates which shall be reasonable, and the confirmation of
Parliament seems to follow quite.as a matter of course. There
is never any doubt expressed about the ability of the Board
to do its work properly. The respect with which the British
treat the decisions of their tribunals is an object lesson for us.
Observe, in contrast, the following: "If such authority (as
that of making rates) had been granted to the (Interstate
Commerce) Commission, it would inevitably have engendered
sectional strife, resulting in serious political disturbances. The
idea that the Interstate Commerce Commission is capable of
performing the service of rate-making efficiently or beneficially,
seems too absurd for serious consideration." 1 Such words as
these seem to be excused by the attitude already referred to
of the courts toward the commission, and by their language,
in some instance, also.2
The opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting in Int. C. C.
v. Alabama X. R. is pertinent here: "Taken in connection
with other decisions . . . the present decision, it seems
to me, goes far to make that commission a useless body for
all practical purposes. . . . It has been shorn, by judicial
interpreatixn,of authority to do anything of an effective character. It is denied many of the powers which, in my judgment, were intended to be conferred upon it." . . . Remembering these expressions of the learned justice, and
taking them in connection with his own opinion in Smyth v.
Ames,3 it must be concluded that the Supreine Court of the
United States has found itself unwilling, under present conditions, to allow effective authority to special railway bodies,
either state or national.
ISee article by Joseph Nimmo, Jr., in the Forum for September, 1897.
Mr. Nimmo adds to the language quoted, "An experience of twenty
years as an officer of the government at Washington convinces me that
governmental management of the railroads is utterly incompatible with
the Constitution and the methods of the administrative government of
the United States."
2For example, note the sarcastic allusions to the "naive remarks" of
the Interstate Commission, in Texas & P. R. v. Int. C. C., 162 U. S. 197.
3 x68 U. S. 144, at p. 176 (1897), supra.

380

GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF TRANSPORTATION CHARGES.

Judicial construction has effectually destroyed legislation
intended to make rates for railroads. In the matter of government fixing of transportation charges, we seem, as Emerson.
says most men have done, to have "arrived with pain and
sweat and fury nowhere." The same result must be reached
in the case of quasi-public corporations generally. Practically
all of these have shareholders in different states, so that in
every case the Federal Courts would have jurisdiction. If the
city, or county, or state fixes a maximum charge the defence
"due process" can be raised, and an injunction obtained from
the nearest circuit court.1 In from two to five years, the case
on appeal will be reached in the United States Supreme Court,
which body will then discover a "reasonable basis of calculating" the profit of gas or electric light making, or of the
telegraph or telephone business; make an investigation of the
figures in the case, and finally pronounce the rates either constitutional or unconstitutional. In the meanwhile a western
city will have had time to increase its population enormously,
and the rates appearing on the records before the court will
be ancient history long before the decision is declared. A
condition which places the determination as to charges in
business of a quasi-public nature all over the country, in the
hands of the Supreme Court, is inconvenient to say the least.
But that is the condition confronting us. Could any different
result have been reached under our constitution ? Possibly.
An attitude a little more like that of the English, a little more
fearful of extending judicial prerogatives, a little less eager to
1 Cases of this kind are multiplying very fast. In Northern P. R. v.
Keyes, 91 Fed. 47 (1898), a rate fixed by the Board of Railroad Commissioners of North Dakota (acting under ch. x5, Laws,-1897), was declared
unreasonably low. In San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 89 Fed.
274 (1898), irrigation rates established under the constitution and laws
of California, were annulled as unreasonable and unjust. In Milwaukee
Electric R. & L. Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 87 Fed. 577 (1898), a case
referred to in the first article of the series in December, '98, the prescribing of a four cent fare for street railroads was pronounced a
"taking" without due process. I see by the newspapers that a similar
decision was reached the other day (May 16th) by Ricks, J., in the
United States Circuit Court at Cleveland. There are many other cases
of like character too numerous for collection in this note.
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construe Bills of Rights and Fourteenth Amendments into
sweeping denials of legislative power, might have brought us
a result somewhat more satisfactory. How have the English
solved the vexed question of a reasonable rate? Their definitions are no better than ours, but they know better how to
decide individual cases:
(x) If a statute, say of railway incorporation, contains the
word "reasonable," and no provision is made for assessment
of rates, "reasonableness" is a judicial question, being a part
of the interpretation of the statute. See Pickford v. Grand
junction Ry. Co.' So, also, under the common law requirement as to rates.
(2) Under parliamentary provisions railway and canal iegulation in general is entrusted to a commission, and this body
as a court-presumably as. able as the other courts of England-decides questions of undue preference and reasonableness. See Plymouth Inc. Chamber of Commercev. Great W. R?
(3)Then the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, as has been
described, vests the rate-making power in the Board of Trade.
Now, accordingly, the Board of Trade, or the arbitrator
appointed by it, has the exclusive determination of the reasonableness of a rate, as to amount, and no court can interfere. See Manchester & N. C. Federation of Coal Traders
v. Lancashire& Y R?
This seems a perfectly intelligible result: "Reasonableness" a matter of law for a common law court, when it depends solely on statutory construction; a mixed question of
law and fact for a body of trained experts, called railroad
commissioners, when it involves "undue preference," when a
decision must be rendered on what might be termed "relative
reasonableness ;" a matter of administration for the Board of
Trade when the amount must be decided as a question of
"absolute reasonableness."
Of course, the Federal character of our government renders so simple a result impossible here, and yet it is quite
1xo M. & W. 399 (1842).
'9 Ry. & Can. Traf. Cas.
3

76 L. T. 786 (1897).

72 (1895).
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conceivable that a working plan could have been arranged,
with a division of jurisdiction and responsibility between the
State and Federal commissions. The question of restraint of.
the too radical zeal of" Populistic" commissions in rural states
comes in also, and has furnished perhaps the best apparent
excuse for the judicial legislation that has landed us where we
are. But it seems certain that the harm done by these "radicals" could not have been as great as that often accomplished
in shorter time by skillful railroad "wreckers," under forms
of law, and with evil results outlasting those wrought by illconsidered governmental interference. But it is of no use to
regret the past action of our courts. We have before us their
handiwork, and the question now is the untangling of the
difficulty. Nothing seems more promising to the writer than
the plan recommended by the Interstate Commerce Commission :
(i) Congress should grant the rate-making power, in cer-

tain cases, to the commission.
(2) The review of the commission's rates by the Federal
courts should end with the Circuit Court of Appeals. That
body's judgment, in short, should be final. By this means a
speedy end could be brought to any dispute.
Similar rules adopted for state commissions, with proper
expedients for correlating Federal and state control of railroads, would give us a result of more satisfactory promise
than the continental system of state ownership, and perhaps
almost as smooth in its working as the English plan above
outlined. It is to be hoped that some definite scheme, at any
rate, will soon replace the present uncertainty.
Roy Wilson White.

